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INTRODUCTION 
  
 The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause prohibits the 
government from establishing, endorsing, or favoring a religion.
1
 The 
Establishment Clause’s most fundamental principle is government 
neutrality towards religion.
2
 This principle of neutrality “is not merely 
a prohibition against the government’s differentiation among religious 
sects,” denomination, or beliefs.3 The principle of neutrality also 
requires that the government not prefer religion in general over 
nonreligion.
4
 By remaining neutral towards religion, the government 
is, however, not prohibited from accommodating religious practices—
that is, exempting individuals and entities from government-imposed 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Notes & Comments Editor, CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW, 2014–15; 
MPA, University of Illinois at Chicago; B.A., Political Science, Elmhurst College. 
1
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2
 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 709 (2005). 
3
 Id. at 709-10.  
4
 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
1
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regulations that burden the free exercise of religion.
5
 Religious 
accommodations, the United States Supreme Court has explained, are 
not inherently incompatible with the neutrality principle, as they seek 
neither to neither advance nor inhibit religion, but simply to “permit 
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without 
interference.”6 Indeed, “in order to guard against governmental 
intrusion into the religious lives of citizens,”7 the principle of 
neutrality may even require that the government accommodate 
religion.
8
 Notwithstanding the permissibility of religious 
accommodation, when the government accommodates religion, it must 
do so in a way that does not “devolve into an unlawful fostering of 
religion,”9 as that would run afoul of the neutrality principle and 
violate the Establishment Clause. 
In Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed 
Indiana’s Marriage Solemnization Statute’s compliance with the 
neutrality principle.
10
 The State of Indiana recognizes a marriage only 
after a state-authorized individual conducts a marriage ceremony and 
performs certain duties imposed by the state.
11
 This is known as 
marriage solemnization and its effect is to create a legally recognized 
                                                 
5
 Scott E. Williams, Religious Exemptions and the Limits of Neutrality, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 119, 120 (1995); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987). 
6
 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 710; Amos, 483 U.S. at 334. 
7
 Williams, supra note 5, at 119. 
8
 Id.; Amos, 483 U.S. at 334. 
9
 Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-35 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations 
omitted). 
10
 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014). 
11
 IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-4-3, 16 (West 2014). For instance, the state-
authorized individual must, within thirty days after the date of the marriage, file the 
marriage license the couple had to obtained prior to the marriage “with the clerk of 
the circuit court who issued” it. Id. at § 16 (a)(3). 
2
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34 
civil marriage.
12
 Indiana’s Marriage Solemnization Statute, aside from 
authorizing certain government officials to solemnize a civil marriage, 
conferred the authority to legalize a marriage—that is, solemnization 
authority—upon certain religious groups as well as upon members of 
the clergy,
13
 as a form of religious accommodation. According to the 
State of Indiana, the Solemnization Statute accommodated members of 
the clergy who generally perform marriages under the commandments 
of their faiths as well as those religions that regard marriage as a 
fundamental tenet.
14
 As a result, the marriage ceremonies of the 
accommodated religions under the Solemnization Statute resulted in 
the solemnization of a marriage, that is, a legal marriage.
15
 The 
marriage ceremonies of those religions not accommodated under the 
Statute, in contrast, could not result in a legally valid marriage.
16
 
Therefore, the couple wishing to get married, in addition to having a 
religious ceremony had to appear before an individual with 
solemnization authority to have their marriage solemnized.
17
 While 
members of the religions not included in the Solemnization Statute 
could still have their marriages solemnized, the Statute was an 
impediment to the members of those religions to have their marriage 
solemnized in ceremonies conducted by officials who share their 
fundamental beliefs, values, and traditions.
18
  
                                                 
12
 See Andrew C. Stevens, By the Power Vested in Me? Licensing Religious 
Officials to Solemnize Marriage in the Age of Same-Sex Marriage, 63 EMORY L.J. 
979, 981 (2014). 
13
 IND. CODE § 31-11-6-1 held unconstitutional by Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 
F.3d 869. 
14
 Brief of Appellees-Defendants – Supplemental Appendix, Ctr. for Inquiry, 
Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3751), 2013 WL 
663844, at *22-23. 
15
 Provided that the religious official presiding over the ceremony complied 
with the requirements the state imposed on him. IND. CODE § 31-11-4-16. 
16
 See Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 872-73.   
17
 Brief of Appellants-Plaintiffs – Short Appendix at 10, Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. 
v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3751); Ctr. for 
Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873. 
18
 See Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873. 
3
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 Had Indiana’s Solemnization Statute in Center for Inquiry been 
challenged by one of the religions not accommodated under the 
Statute, the question of whether the Statute complied with the 
neutrality principle would have been a straightforward one for the 
Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “the 
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”19 A 
religious accommodation thus violates the Establishment Clause if it 
“singles out a particular religious sect [or sects]” for the 
accommodation without a proper justification.
20
 The Solemnization 
Statute’s preference for certain religious creeds was immediately 
apparent. The Statute preferred religions in which members of the 
clergy perform the marriage ceremonies over religions in which non-
clergy leaders conduct the marriage ceremonies.
21
 It also preferred 
religions that accord marriage a sacred status over religions that, 
although not attaching a sacred status to marriage, still celebrate 
marriage.
22
 Further, the Statute’s preference for certain religions was 
unwarranted as the value that it each religion attaches to marriage 
cannot be a proper justification for the differential treatment.
23
 The 
                                                 
19
 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714 
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
20
 Id. at 706; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005); see infra note 23.  
21
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 874. 
22
 Id. Buddhists, for example, could not have their marriage solemnized in their 
religious ceremonies as Buddhism does not have members of the clergy and the 
Statute did not identify Buddhism as an accommodated religion. See id. 
23
 The neutrality principle does not require that a religious accommodation be 
indiscriminately conferred upon all religions. For example, the neutrality principle 
does not require that an accommodation for observance of the Sabbath Day be 
extended to all religions as not all religions observe the Sabbath Day. However, 
whereas here, different religions share a practice—marriage—an accommodation 
may not be extended to some religions and not to others based on the value that each 
religion attaches to marriage. See generally Fowler v. R.I., 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 
(1953); Grumet, 512 U.S. at 715-16 (the government may not penalize or 
discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views the 
government does not regard as valuable or desirable). Accordingly, the analysis of 
this Note proceeds from the understanding that marriage is a practice shared by 
4
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challenge to the Solemnization Statute, however, was brought by 
Center for Inquiry, Inc. (“CFI”), a non-religious, secular entity which 
promotes ethical living without a belief in a Supreme Being and which 
teaches a set of human values “upon which its members are to base 
their lives, actions, relationships and decisions.”24 The system of 
beliefs of CFI is generally known as “secular humanism” and its main 
“commitment [is] to improve human welfare in the world.”25 Like 
religious organizations, CFI celebrates important life events, including 
marriages.
26
 CFI’s marriage ceremonies are designed to represent and 
celebrate CFI’s values and philosophies.27 Given, however, that the 
Solemnization Statute did not extend the authority to solemnize a 
marriage to CFI, its marriage ceremonies, just as those of the religions 
not accommodated under the Statute, could not result in a legal 
marriage.
28
 Thus, in Center for Inquiry, the Seventh Circuit faced the 
more difficult question of whether Indiana’s Solemnization Statute ran 
afoul of the neutrality principle by failing to confer solemnization 
authority upon CFI.  
In holding that Indiana’s Solemnization Statute violated the 
neutrality principle by failing to extend the authority to solemnize a 
marriage to CFI, the Seventh Circuit had to address two main issues. 
First, the Seventh Circuit had to determine whether CFI’s beliefs 
qualified as “religious” for purposes of the First Amendment. Second, 
the Seventh Circuit had to address the well-accepted premise that 
states may, consistent with the neutrality principle, accommodate 
religious groups without having to extend similar accommodations to 
secular entities.
29
 In addressing these questions, the Seventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                   
various religions and from the premise that the value each religion attaches to 
marriage cannot be a proper justification for conferring solemnization authority only 
upon some religions.  
24
 Brief of Appellants, supra note 17, at 5-6. 
25
 Id. at 6 (citations omitted).  
26
 Id. at 9. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. at 10. 
29
 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005).  
5
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37 
had guidance from its own as well as Supreme Court precedent, but no 
conclusive answers. This Note posits that, in concluding that CFI’s 
beliefs were the equivalent of religion, the Seventh Circuit properly 
employed a broad definition of religion, which has strong roots in 
Supreme Court’s and Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence. This Note also 
defends the Seventh Circuit’s omission of Supreme Court precedent 
that arguably supports a narrower definition of religion as even a 
reference to such precedent would have caused confusion as to what is 
generally regarded as the proper test for ascertaining what qualifies as 
a religion for purposes of First Amendment analysis. Moreover, the 
application of a narrower definition of religion would have threatened 
to leave many of the rich and diverse beliefs Americans see as their 
“religion” without protections under the First Amendment. Lastly, this 
Note discusses Supreme Court precedent not addressed by the Seventh 
Circuit that appeared to support Indiana’s contention that it was not 
obliged to include CFI in the Solemnization Statute to comply with the 
neutrality principle. This Note explains that such a precedent did not 
require a different result.  
 
I. NEUTRALITY AND RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS   
 
A. The Neutrality Principle 
 
 The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.”30 The “touchstone” of the Establishment Clause is “the 
principle that the First Amendment mandates government neutrality 
between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion.”31 This principle, known as the neutrality principle, 
prohibits the government from treating people differently “based on 
                                                 
30
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
31
 McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).  
6
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the Gods or gods they worship, or do not worship.”32 There are two 
fundamental dimensions to the neutrality principle.
33
 First, neutrality 
requires that the government “neither favor nor disfavor religion in 
general, as compared to nonreligion.”34 Consistent with this 
requirement, the government may not “pass laws or impose 
requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers.”35 
Likewise, the government may not “act[ ] with the ostensible and 
predominant purpose of advancing [or inhibiting] religion” as there is 
“no neutrality when the government’s ostensible object is to take 
sides.”36 Second, the neutrality principle requires the government to 
treat religions equally, unless there is a secular justification for 
differential treatment.
37
 In its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has explained that the “clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be 
officially preferred over another.”38  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714 
(1994). 
33
 Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 505, 515 (1998); Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious 
Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 
75 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (2000). 
34
 Conkle, supra note 33, at 8.  
35
 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333, 
356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the government, “having chosen to 
exempt . . . cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on 
the one hand and secular beliefs on the other”). 
36
 McCreary Cnty., Ky, 545 U.S. at 860. 
37
 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 714. 
38
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); Gillette v. U.S., 
401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971) (“An attack founded on disparate treatment of ‘religious’ 
claims invokes what is perhaps the central purpose of the Establishment Clause–the 
purpose of ensuring government neutrality in matters of religion.”). 
7
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B. Religious Accommodations 
 
The neutrality principle, however, does not forbid the government 
from accommodating religion.
39
 The Supreme Court “has long 
recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) 
accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without 
violating the Establishment Clause.”40 When the government 
accommodates a religious practice, it exempts a religious person or 
entity from government-imposed regulatory requirements that burden 
that person’s or entity’s exercise of religion.41 The government may, 
for instance, on the basis of religion, exempt individuals from 
participating in war;
42
 allow non-for-profit religious organizations to 
discriminate in certain employment practices;
43
 permit prison inmates 
to form religious study groups;
44
 grant property tax exemptions to 
religious entities;
45
 and allow religious organizations to solemnize 
their own marriages.
46
 At first sight, such accommodations may appear 
to run afoul of the neutrality principle as they may be seen as a 
government-conferred benefit on the religious, in the form of an 
exemption from compliance with a law.
47
 Religious accommodations, 
                                                 
39
 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-20 (2005); Corp. of Presiding Bishop 
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 
(1987); Amos, 483 U.S. 327 at 348 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
40
 Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (internal quotations marks omitted) (citations 
omitted); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 
(1987). 
41
 Amos, 483 U.S. at 338; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of 
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 
(1992). 
42
 Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970); U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
43
 Amos, 483 U.S. at 329-30.  
44
 Cutter, 544 U.S. 709; Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
45
 Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
46
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014). 
47
 This Note does not address the controversy surrounding religious 
accommodations. For a discussion see Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of 
8
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however, are not incompatible with the neutrality principle because 
their inherent objective is not to “advance[ ] religion nor . . . [to] 
inhibit[ ]” it,48 but simply to “lift[ ] a [government-placed] regulation 
that burdens the exercise of religion.”49  
 Supreme Court jurisprudence explains the manner in which 
religious accommodations fit into the concept of neutrality. Together, 
the Religious Clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution 
provide that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”50 The first clause, 
the Establishment Clause, prohibits the government from establishing, 
preferring, or endorsing a religion. The second clause, the Free 
Exercise Clause, prohibits the government from interfering with the 
practice of religious beliefs. The two clauses are in tension
51
 and “if 
expanded to a logical extreme, [each] would tend to clash with the 
other.”52 For example, “limits on governmental action that might make 
sense as a way to avoid establishment could  . . . [nevertheless] limit 
freedom” of religion if governmental action is necessary to allow the 
                                                                                                                   
Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes 
Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417 (2012); Steven G. Gey, Why Is 
Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1990); McConnell, 
supra note 41, at 685-742; Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The 
Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 
555 (1998). 
48
 Walz, 397 U.S. at 672. 
49
 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987). 
50
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
51
 McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005) (explaining 
by way of illustration how “[t]he two clauses compete: spending government money 
on the clergy looks like establishing religion, but if the government cannot pay for 
military chaplains a good many soldiers and sailors would be kept from the 
opportunity to exercise their chosen religions”) (citations omitted). For a discussion 
that the clauses do not conflict, see Carl H. Esbeck, When Accommodations for 
Religion Violate the Establishment Clause: Regularizing the Supreme Court’s 
Analysis, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 359, 362-65 (2007). 
52
 Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69. 
9
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free exercise thereof.
53
  However, the Supreme Court has explained 
that in between the “joints”54 of the Religious Clauses “there is 
[ample] room for play,” 55 which “permit[s] religious exercise to exist 
without sponsorship and without interference.”56 That is to say, in 
between the Religious Clauses, there is “corridor”57 or “space . . . 
neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause,”58 in which the government may act to 
accommodate religious beliefs. When the government acts within that 
corridor, it operates with “benevolent neutrality,”59 which is tolerable 
and even desirable under the Establishment Clause. 
In accommodating religion, the government does not, however, 
have carte blanche to accommodate religious individuals and entities 
to its liking. To the contrary, the government must ensure that religious 
accommodations do not “devolve into unlawful fostering”60 of religion 
in general or of a particular religious sect or denomination. At that 
point, the accommodation would no longer be benevolently neutral, 
but would violate the requirements of the neutrality principle and 
result in an impermissible establishment of religion.
61
 This was the 
precise issue the Seventh Circuit faced in Center for Inquiry. There, 
the court had to decide whether Indiana’s Marriage Solemnization 
Statute crossed the boundaries of benevolent neutrality by allowing 
only certain religious denominations to solemnize marriages.  
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 McCreary Cnty., Ky., 545 U.S. at 875. 
54
 Id.  
55
 Walz, 397 U.S. at 669; Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987).  
56
 Walz, 397 U.S. at 669. 
57
 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
58
 Id. at 719.  
59
 Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
60
 Id. at 334-35 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).  
61
 See McConnell, supra note 41, at 686-88. 
10
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II. STATE REGULATION OF MARRIAGE AND SOLEMNIZATION STATUTES 
 
A. State Regulation of Marriage 
 
The regulation of marriage is “the province” of the states, rather 
than of the federal government.
62
 Accordingly, the states “prescribe the 
conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens 
shall be created.”63 While the laws regulating marriage vary across the 
states,
64
 there are certain requisites for a valid marriage that the states 
share. Generally, states require individuals wishing to get married to 
apply for and obtain a marriage license from a designated government 
entity.
65
 The state’s issuance of the license, itself, does not ordinarily 
result in a legally binding marriage.
66
 In most states, marriage 
solemnization is required to create a legally recognized civil 
marriage.
67
 Marriage solemnization refers to a ceremony or a “ritual 
by which . . . [two individuals] take on their new status” as husband 
and wife.
68
 As a general rule, the solemnization of the marriage must 
be conducted by a state-authorized individual, who also performs 
certain duties (such as signing the marriage license) the state has 
                                                 
62
 Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 
(1975); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). 
63
 Penoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878); Hill, 125 U.S. at 205 (stating 
that  state legislatures “prescribe[ ] . . . the procedure or form essential to constitute 
marriage”). 
64
 See Robert E. Rains, Marriage in the Time of Internet Ministers: I Now 
Pronounce You Married, but Who Am I to Do So?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 809, 842-77 
(2010); Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Clerk, Marion Cir. Ct, No. 1:12-CV-00623-SEB, 
2012 WL 5997721, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 2012) rev’d sub nom. by Ctr. for 
Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014). 
65
 Rains, supra note 64, at 838-39. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-30 (West 
2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122.040 (West 2013). 
66
 Stevens, supra note 12, at 987. 
67
 Id. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.07 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-2-109 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (West 2014). 
68
 Rains, supra note 64, at 839. 
11
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imposed on him in order for the marriage to be complete.
69
 In some 
states, it is a crime to solemnize a marriage without the state’s 
authority.
70
 
  
B. Solemnization Statutes and Religious Accommodations 
 
Typically, states bestow the authority to solemnize a marriage in 
their solemnization statutes upon specific individuals or entities.
71
 
Such statutes invariably confer the authority to solemnize a marriage 
upon certain government officials, such as judges and justices of the 
peace.
72
 At least thirteen states also permit public notaries,
73
 the couple 
aspiring to get married,
74
 or any person to solemnize a marriage.
75
 The 
solemnization statutes usually also authorize religious officials to 
solemnize marriages.
76
 The states’ decision to confer solemnization 
authority upon religious officials has gone unchallenged throughout 
the history of this country.
77
 Thus, courts have had no opportunity to 
address how religious solemnization of a civil marriage fits into the 
Religious Clauses and the principle of neutrality. Religious 
solemnization of marriages, however, has existed since colonial times 
and it, in the present day, may best be described as a permissible 
                                                 
69
 Id. at 842-77. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-30; HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-
13 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.7 (West 2014). 
70
 Stevens, supra note 12, at 987. 
71
 See Rains, supra note 64, at 842-77. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
25.05.261 (West 2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-213 (West 2007); CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 400 (West 2013). 
72
 Stevens, supra note 12, at 987; supra note 55. 
73
 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.07; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-20, 26-1-90 
(2014). 
74
 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-
301; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1502 (West 2014). 
75
 See, e.g., COLO. § 14-2-109; MONT. § 40-1-301; 23 PA. § 1502; N.Y. § 
11(4). 
76
 Id.  
77
 Stevens, supra note 12, at 987-88.  
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accommodation of religion.
78
 Indeed, “long before marriage was a 
civil institution regulated by . . . [the states], it was a religious contract 
and commandment.”79 Given that “marriage as an institution owes its 
origins to religious roots, it is both natural and logical that when state 
government[s] regulate[ ] entry into marriage, [they] accommodate[ ]” 
religious traditions regarding marriage practices.
80
 In other words, 
since the requirement that a state-authorized official solemnize a 
marriage before it can be legal may interfere with the religious 
practices of individuals to have their marriage solemnized by a 
religious official of their faith, the states may justifiably lift such 
governmental interference by allowing religious officials to also 
solemnize a marriage.  
 
C. Marriage Procedure in Indiana and the Marriage 
Solemnization Statute, Indiana Code §31-11-61 
 
In the State of Indiana, individuals may be legally married only 
after obtaining a marriage license and having their marriage 
solemnized.
81
 The individuals aspiring to get married may obtain a 
marriage license from the clerk of the circuit court in which any of 
them resides or in the circuit in which the marriage will occur.
82
 The 
marriage license includes an original and a duplicate marriage 
certificate.
83
 After securing the marriage license and certificates, the 
                                                 
78
 See Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 872-74 (7th 
Cir. 2014); Woods-Bateman v. Hawai’i, No. CIV.07-00119 HG LEK, 2008 WL 
2051671, at *11 (D. Haw. May 13, 2008) (“In providing for the licensing of 
individuals to perform religious ceremonies, the State of Hawaii is accommodating 
the deeply held beliefs of many of its citizens who prefer the marriage be solemnized 
by a leader of their religion.”). 
79
 Brief of Appellees, supra note 14, at *32 (citing to Joel A. Nichols, 
Misunderstanding Marriage and Missing Religion, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 195, 202 
(2011)). See also Stevens, supra note 12, at 984. 
80
 Id. 
81
 IND. CODE § 31-11-4-1, 3, 13. 
82
 Id. § 31–11–4–3. 
83
 Id. § 31–11–4–15. 
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couple to be married “must present . . . [the] license to an individual . . 
. authorized” under Indiana’s Solemnization Statute to solemnize a 
marriage.
84
 To solemnize a marriage, the state-authorized individual 
presides over a ceremony, in which the couple takes each other as 
husband and wife.
85
 In addition, the state-authorized individual, within 
30 days of the ceremony, signs and files the license, along with the 
duplicate marriage certificate, with the clerk who issued the license.
86
 
This completes the marriage solemnization process and creates a 
legally binding marriage. 
Until July 2014, Indiana’s Solemnization Statute vested the 
authority to solemnize a marriage in the following individuals and 
entities: 
 
 (1) A member of the clergy of a religious organization (even 
if the cleric does not perform religious functions for an individual 
congregation), such as a minister of the gospel, a priest, a bishop, 
an archbishop, or a rabbi. 
(2) A judge. 
(3) A mayor, within the mayor’s county. 
(4) A clerk or a clerk-treasurer of a city or town, within a county 
in which the city or town is located. 
(5) A clerk of the circuit court. 
(6) The Friends Church, in accordance with the rules of the 
Friends Church. 
(7) The German Baptists, in accordance with the rules of their 
society. 
(8) The Bahai faith, in accordance with the rules of the Bahai 
faith. 
(9) The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, in accordance 
with the rules of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. 
                                                 
84
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Clerk, Marion Cir. Ct, No. 1:12-CV-00623-SEB, 
2012 WL 5997721, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 2012). 
85
 Rains, supra note 64, at 839. 
86
 IND. CODE § 31–11–4–16. 
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(10) An imam of a masjid (mosque), in accordance with the rules 
of the religion of Islam.
87
 
 
Under Indiana’s Solemnization Statute, anyone who solemnized a 
marriage ceremony without the authority of the state committed a 
Class B misdemeanor.
88
 
 
III. CENTER FOR INQUIRY, INC. V. MARION CIRCUIT COURT CLERK 
 
On June 11, 2012, the Indiana branch of CFI, sought a temporary 
and permanent injunction in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana “to bar . . . the Clerk of the Marion Circuit 
Court . . . and the Marion County Prosecutor . . . from enforcing 
Indiana’s Solemnization Statute.”89 CFI asserted, inter alia,90 that the 
Solemnization Statute was facially unconstitutional because it created 
a preference for religion over nonreligion, in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.
91
 More specifically, CFI contended that the 
Solemnization Statute ran afoul of the neutrality principle because it 
preferred religion over nonreligion by extending the authority to 
solemnize marriages only to certain religious organizations.
92
  
 
                                                 
87
 Id. § 31–11–6–1. 
88
 Id. 
89
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *1. 
90
 In addition to the First Amendment claim, CFI alleged that Indiana’s 
Solemnization Statute was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it extended the authority to solemnize a marriage to 
religious leader and thus, allowed religious persons to be married by religious 
leaders of their choice while denying the same rights to non-religious persons. Id. at 
*5 (citations omitted). The Equal Protection claim is beyond the subject of this Note. 
The Seventh Circuit addressed the Equal Protection claim only briefly and concluded 
that the Solemnization Statute was also unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause because it discriminated arbitrarily among religious and secular ethical 
beliefs. Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 
2014).  
91
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *5. 
92
 Id.  
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A. Center for Inquiry, Inc. and its Secular Marriage 
Celebrations 
 
 CFI is an international not-for-profit organization with 
approximately 24,000 members
93
 and nineteen branches in the United 
States, including one in Indiana.
94
 CFI “describes itself as a humanist 
group that promotes ethical living without a belief in a deity.”95 Its 
mission is to promote a purely secular society based on science
96
 by 
advocating that it is “possible to have strong ethical values based on 
critical reason and scientific inquiry rather than theism and faith.”97 
Accordingly, CFI rejects blind faith and promotes the use of scientific 
methods instead.
98
 CFI believes that “integrity, trustworthiness, 
benevolence, and fairness”99 are the core values of “effective morality 
and a model for living a good life.”100 Based on these values, CFI 
“maintain[s] and teaches a set of beliefs upon which its members are 
to base their lives, actions, relationships and decisions.”101 This system 
of beliefs is usually denominated “secular humanism”102and it “play[s] 
the same role in . . . [CFI] members’ lives as religious methods and 
values play in the lives of adherents.”103  
To provide its members with ceremonies that express their 
philosophies and values, CFI conducts “secular celebrations.”104 These 
                                                 
93
 Id. at * 2. 
94
 Center for Inquiry, CFI Branches, http://www.centerforinquiry.net/about/ 
branches (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).  
95
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 871. 
96
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *2 (citations omitted). 
97
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 871. 
98
 Center for Inquiry, About Center for Inquiry, http://www.centerforinquiry. 
net/ about (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).  
99
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *3 (citations omitted). 
100
 Id. 
101
 Brief of Appellants, supra note 17, at 6. 
102
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *2. 
103
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 871. 
104
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *3. 
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secular celebrations usually mark important life events
105
 such as 
funerals, memorials, and marriages.
106
 Since 2009, when CFI began its 
secular celebrations, certified CFI members, also known as secular 
celebrants, preside over these ceremonies.
107
 In Indiana, Reba Boyd 
Wooden, a certified secular celebrant and the leader of CFI’s Indiana 
branch, conducted marriage ceremonies for CFI members, but was 
unable to solemnize their marriages because CFI was not included in 
Indiana’s Solemnization Statute.108 Although the Solemnization Statute 
vested solemnization authority on members of the clergy, Ms. Wooden 
could still not solemnize a marriage, as Indiana does not recognize 
CFI’s leaders as clergy because CFI is not a religious organization.109 
CFI was, however, unwilling to declare itself a religious organization 
and get its leaders clergy credential in order to be able to solemnize 
marriages.
110
And, while in other states, CFI’s leaders may solemnize a 
marriage under the title of public notaries,
111
 Indiana’s Solemnization 
Statute also did not confer solemnization authority upon notaries. After 
Ms. Wooden was unable to solemnize the marriage of her longtime 
friends and mentees,
112
 Ms.Wooden, her friends and mentees,
113
 and 
CFI challenged the Solemnization Statute on the grounds that it 
violated the neutrality principle as it preferred religion over 
nonreligion by extending solemnization authority only to religious 
                                                 
105
 Center for Inquiry, CFI Secular Program, http://www.centerforinquiry.net/ 
education/secular_celebrants/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
106
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *3. 
107
 Id. at *4. 
108
 Id. at *3-4. 
109
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 
2014). 
110
 Id. at 871. 
111
 Center for Inquiry, CFI Celebrant Certification, http://www.centerfor 
inquiry. net/education/celebrant_certification/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2014); Ctr. for 
Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 871.   
112
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *3. 
113
 In October 2012, while the lawsuit was still pending in the district court, 
Ms. Wooden’s friends and mentees had their marriage solemnized by a state-
approved individual and, consequently, withdrew as parties in the lawsuit. Id. 
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groups.
114
 CFI asked that the District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana enter a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent the 
Clerk of the Marion Circuit Court and the Marion County Prosecutor 
from enforcing the Statute against them.
115
  
 
B. The Decision of the District Court 
 
On November 30, 2012, the district court denied CFI’s request for 
injunctive relief and entered judgment in favor of the Clerk of the 
Marion Circuit Court and the Marion County Prosecutor.
116
 In its 
opinion, the district court covered constitutional ground that is beyond 
the scope of this Note.
117
 Relevant to the subject of this Note, the court 
explained that Indiana could place reasonable regulations on marriage, 
designating the procedures by which a marriage becomes legally 
effective as well as the persons authorized to solemnize a marriage.
118
 
Given that marriage has deep religious roots, the court explained, it 
was “both natural and logical” for Indiana to “accommodate[ ] those 
deep religious traditions.”119 The Solemnization Statute, the district 
court continued, simply accommodates religions that regard marriage 
as a fundamental tenet, allowing those religions to “place their ‘stamp 
of approval’ on marriages”120 and preserving their “ability . . . to . . . 
                                                 
114
 Id. at *5. 
115
 Id. at *1.  
116
 Id. at *14.  
117
 Although CFI challenged Indiana’s Solemnization Statute under the 
Establishment Clause, the district court also assessed the constitutionality of the 
Statute under the Free Exercise Clause, expressing doubt that CFI’s claim fell within 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. at *8-10. This Note does not address 
whether CFI’s claim fell within the purview of the Establishment Clause or the Free 
Exercise Clause. For a discussion of which of the two Clauses should guide the 
analysis in claims of the nature brought by CFI, see the concurring and dissenting 
opinions in Welsh v. U.S. and majority and concurring opinions in Cutter v. 
Wilkinson. 
118
 Id. at *10. 
119
 Id.  
120
 Id.  
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carry out their religious missions.”121 Finding that CFI was not a 
religion and that CFI had no stance on marriage, the court concluded 
that CFI was, therefore, not entitled to a similar accommodation.
122
  
The district court further stated that CFI could not characterize its 
beliefs as a religion simply to avoid the inconveniences of marriage 
regulation. The district court then explained that in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
a religious accommodation case, the Supreme Court had stated that 
“‘the very concept or ordered liberty precludes allowing [everyone] to 
make . . . [their] own standards’” to trigger the protection of the 
Religious Clauses and avoid state regulation.
123
 Thus, the district court 
stated that it could not “commandeer the Indiana legislature” to 
include CFI in the Solemnization Statute simply because CFI preferred 
to solemnize its own marriages.
124
 Members of CFI, after all, the court 
explained, had “numerous avenues through which they . . . [could] 
legally wed.”125 They could continue with their secular celebrations 
and then have their marriage solemnized by, for example, a judge as 
the Solemnization Statute only prohibited CFI and others “from 
signing marriage certificates.”126 In short, the court held that the 
Statute could not amount to an establishment of religion as it only had 
the “legitimate purpose of alleviating significant governmental 
interference with pre-existing religious beliefs about marriage.”127 
 
C. The Appeal to the Seventh Circuit 
 
CFI appealed the decision of the district court to the Seventh 
Circuit. Before the Seventh Circuit, CFI argued that CFI’s beliefs were 
                                                 
121
 Id. 
122
 Id. at *7, 10. 
123
 Id. at *9 (citations omitted). 
124
 Id.  
125
 Id. 
126
 Id.  
127
 Id. at *12. 
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“equivalent to a religion”128 because CFI’s beliefs are sincere and 
“address[ ] matters of ‘ultimate concern’ that occupy a ‘place parallel 
to that filled by . . . God in traditionally religious persons.’”129 Because 
CFI had to be “deemed to be analogous to a religion, its exclusion 
from the benefits bestowed by the Solemnization Statute represent[ed] 
a preference for particular sects or creeds.”130 CFI further argued that 
Indiana’s defense that it excluded CFI from the Solemnization Statute 
because CFI takes no stance on religion was simply a pretext to avoid 
the Establishment Clause claim. Given that Indiana was willing to 
allow CFI’s secular celebrants to solemnize marriages if CFI declared 
itself a religious organization, thereby rendering its leaders clergy, it 
was apparent, CFI argued, that Indiana excluded CFI not because of 
CFI’s stand on marriage, but because it was not a religious entity.131 
Regardless of CFI’s position on marriage, however, CFI argued that 
CFI members, like adherents of traditional religions, “desire to have 
their wedding ceremonies reflect their values and beliefs.”132 For CFI 
members, as for members of religions, “it is important to have 
someone perform the [solemnization] ceremony who shares their 
ethics and beliefs and who is able to assist them in in structuring a 
ceremony in a way that affirms their philosophy.”133 
In defending the constitutionality of the Solemnization Statute, 
Indiana reiterated the holding of the district court that the 
Solemnization Statute was a religious accommodation under which 
CFI could not be included because CFI could not be said to be a 
religion.
134
 Indiana further argued that states may constitutionally 
accommodate religious beliefs without having to extend the same or 
substantially similar accommodations to non-religious groups. 
                                                 
128
 Reply Brief of Appellants-Plaintiffs, Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. 
Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3751), 2013 WL 1208815, at *9.  
129
 Id. at *10-11 (citations omitted). 
130
 Id. at *14.  
131
 Id. at *7, 8, 14.  
132
 Id. at *17. 
133
 Brief of Appellants, supra note 17, at 9.  
134
 Brief of Appellees, supra note 14, at *14-5.  
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Quoting to Supreme Court precedent specifically addressing religious 
accommodations and their relation to the neutrality principle, Indiana 
pointed out that the Supreme Court had already stated that religious 
accommodations need not to “come packaged with benefits to secular 
entities” in order to comply with the Establishment Clause.135 Relying 
on Marsh v. Chambers, a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
opening of legislative sessions with Christian prayer, Indiana 
explained that “[j]ust as legislative bodies may,” under Marsh, “invite 
clergy to give a prayer without also inviting secular humanists to give 
non-religious speeches, so may states continue to delegate to religious 
clergy . . . the function of solemnizing marriages without also 
delegating that function to other” non-religious groups.136   
The Seventh Circuit was thus not asked to determine whether 
conferring solemnization authority to religious groups may 
accommodate religious marriage practices. The parties did not dispute 
that the Solemnization Statute qualified as a religious accommodation. 
Rather, the court was left with the question of whether the neutrality 
principle required that CFI be included in the Solemnization Statute. 
  
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S AND SEVENTH’S CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE 
ON RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS AND THE NEUTRALITY 
PRINCIPLE 
 
 The Supreme Court has long recognized that religious 
accommodations are permissible, and sometimes even required, under 
the Establishment Clause.
137
 In stating that religious accommodations 
are not inherently incompatible with the Establishment Clause, the 
Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he course of constitutional 
neutrality . . . cannot be an absolutely straight line.”138 Instead, the 
                                                 
135
 See id. at *43. 
136
 Id. at *22-23.  
137
 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 
(1994); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of 
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987). 
138
 Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). 
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principle of neutrality provides a corridor in which the government has 
room to act to ensure that the objectives of both Religious Clauses are 
fulfilled—those objectives being the guarantee to free exercise of 
religion without state interference and without sponsorship.
139
 Indeed, 
in the absence of religious accommodations, the basic purposes of the 
Religious Clauses could be frustrated as rigid government regulation 
(that, which would allow for no accommodations on the basis of 
religion) could interfere with the practice of religion and, thereby, 
inhibit neutrality towards religion.
140
 However, the Supreme Court has 
also stated that religious accommodations are constitutional under the 
Establishment Clause only if they comply with the principle of 
neutrality, preferring neither religion over nonreligion nor any 
particular religious beliefs.
141
  
 
A. The Supreme Court’s Definition of Religion 
 
In assessing the compliance of a religious accommodation under 
the neutrality principle, an initial challenge may be to determine 
whether the beliefs allegedly excluded from a given accommodation 
can be deemed to be a “religion.” This was one of the very challenges 
the Seventh Circuit faced in Center for Inquiry.
142
 The United States 
Constitution does not define religion and the Supreme Court has never 
adopted or announced a constitutional definition of religion. 
Nonetheless, the Court has provided ample guidance on what may 
constitute religion for purposes of the First Amendment. Far from 
exhibiting a static conception of the meaning of religion, the Court’s 
understanding of religion has, for the most part, evolved with time. 
At the beginning of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the 
meaning of religion, the Court followed the traditional view that 
religion necessarily requires a belief in a deity. In Davis v. Beason, for 
example, the Court stated that “the term ‘religion’ has reference to 
                                                 
139
 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-20 (2005). 
140
 Walz, 397 U.S. at 669. 
141
 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 696. 
142
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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one’s views of his relation to his Creator.”143 However, the Court’s 
view of religion evolved with the passing of time. In Torcaso v. 
Watkins, the Court explained that the term “religion” needs not to be 
based on a belief in the existence of God to get First Amendment 
protections.
144
 In stating so, the Court acknowledged the religious 
diversity that existed in the country at the time, explaining in a 
footnote that Americans were practicing religions that did not, in a 
general sense, teach a belief in the existence of God, among them 
“Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, [and] Secular Humanism.”145  
In two subsequent cases of remarkable importance in the 
jurisprudence of the meaning of religion, United States v. Seeger
146
 
and Welsh v. United States,
147
 the Supreme Court dramatically 
expanded the definition of religion. Seeger and Welsh called the Court 
to interpret the meaning of “religious training and belief” in a statute 
that exempted conscientious objectors from participating in war.
148
 
Pursuant to the statute, an individual could claim conscientious 
objector status if “by reason of religious training and belief . . . [the 
individual was] conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any 
form.”149 The statute defined “religious training and belief” as “an 
individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties 
superior to those arising from any human relation, but d[id not] not 
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a 
merely personal moral code.”150  
To avoid rendering the statute unconstitutional by limiting its 
reach to only those religious beliefs rooted in a belief in a Supreme 
                                                 
143
 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) abrogated on other grounds by Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
144
 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). 
145
 Id. at 495 n.11.  
146
 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
147
 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
148
 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165; Welsh, 398 U.S. at 346. 
149
 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations 
omitted). 
150
 Id. at 337. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).  
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Being, the Court interpreted “religious training and belief” in Seeger 
to mean “a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of 
its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God.”151 Five years 
later, in Welsh, the Court expanded the definition of religion even 
further. There, to avoid rendering the statute unconstitutional by 
limiting its reach to only religious beliefs, the Court read “religious 
training and belief” to include “deeply and sincerely h[e]ld beliefs that 
are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless 
impose upon . . . [an individual] a duty of conscience to refrain from 
participating in any war at any time.”152 
The broad and liberal definition of religion the Court reached in 
Seeger and, later, in Welsh is not, however, without any boundaries. In 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,
153
 the Supreme Court discussed some limits on 
what may be deemed a religion under the First Amendment. There, the 
Court stated that “philosophical and personal” beliefs do not trigger 
the protections of the Religion Clauses.
154
 Thus, “[a] way of life, 
however virtuous and admirable,” the Court explained, does not 
constitute religion, and “may not be interposed as a barrier to 
reasonable state regulation.”155 In Yoder, the Court exempted from 
compliance with Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law 
Amish individuals who, for religious reasons, refused to send their 
children to school past the eighth grade.
156
 In allowing the religious 
exemption, the Court explained that “if the Amish had asserted their 
claims [against compulsory education] because of their subjective 
evaluation and rejection of the . . . secular values accepted by the 
majority, their claims would” not have been entitled to an 
accommodation.
157
 Instead, the Court noted, “the record . . . 
support[ed],” that the Amish’s reasons for refusing to send their 
                                                 
151
 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176. 
152
 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340. 
153
 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
154
 Id. at 216.  
155
 Id. at 215. 
156
 Id. at 206.  
157
 Id. at 216.  
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children to school past the eighth grade were “not merely a matter of 
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an 
organized group, and intimately related to daily living.”158 
In Yoder, the Supreme Court thus clarified that personal 
philosophies and “ways of life” do not amount to religious beliefs 
under the First Amendment, perhaps to limit a broad reading of Welsh 
that would have permitted such a result.
159
 The Court also appeared to 
stay that “one essential characteristic of religion is that it comprises an 
‘organized’ community practicing a distinct way of life which is in 
turned based on its particular values.”160 Given, however, that none of 
the individuals challenging the constitutionality of the statute in 
Seeger and Welsh claimed to be to be part of an organized religious 
group, it is unlikely that Yoder makes affiliation with a religious group 
a requirement of religion. A better reading of Yoder is that the Court 
considers affiliation with an organized religious group mere evidence 
of religion.
161
 Importantly, Yoder “seems to leave intact” Seeger’s and 
Welsh’s holding that sincerely held “beliefs [that] function in a position 
parallel to that of traditional religious beliefs”162 are the equivalent of 
religion for First Amendment purposes. Hence, Welsh, Seeger, and 
Yoder, taken together, establish that secular beliefs that are sincerely 
held and that occupy a place in the life of an individual similar to that 
of religion may be regarded as religious and thus, be entitled to a 
                                                 
158
 Id.  
159
 See generally B. Douglas Hayes, Secular Humanism in Public School 
Textbooks: Thou Shalt Have No Other God (Except Thyself), 63 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 358, 361 (1988); L. Scott Smith, Esq., Constitutional Meanings of “Religion” 
Past and Present: Explorations in Definition and Theory, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. 
L. REV. 89, 97 (2004); James M. Donovan, God Is As God Does: Law, 
Anthropology, and the Definition of “Religion,” 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23, 53 
(1995). 
160
 Smith, supra note 159, at 97. 
161
 John C. Knechtle, If We Don’t Know What It Is, How Do We Know If It’s 
Established?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 521, 526 (2003); Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 54 (2nd Cir. 1988) (stating that exemptions on the basis of 
sincere religious beliefs are permitted without regard to church affiliation); Hanna v. 
Sec'y of the Army, 513 F.3d 4, 15 (1st Cir. 2008). 
162
 Hayes, supra note 159, at 361. 
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religious accommodation. A way of life and personal philosophies, in 
contrast, are not entitled to religious protections under the First 
Amendment. 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Definition of Religion 
 
The Supreme Court has not been alone in determining what 
beliefs may qualify as religious for purposes of the First Amendment. 
The Seventh Circuit has also had opportunity to address the definition 
of religion. In Kaufman v. McCaughtry,
163
 for example, the Seventh 
Circuit provided a test for determining what constitutes a religion for 
First Amendment analysis. There, the Seventh Circuit explained that 
whether a set of beliefs “is a ‘religion’ for First Amendment purposes 
is a somewhat different question than whether its adherents believe in 
a supreme being, or attend regular devotional services, or have a 
sacred Scripture.”164 For First Amendment analysis, the Seventh 
Circuit continued, the beliefs of a person represent that person’s 
religion if the person “sincerely holds” those beliefs and such beliefs 
deal “with issues of ‘ultimate concern’ that . . . occupy a ‘place parallel 
to that filled by . . . God in traditionally religious persons.”165 Citing to 
Torcaso, Welsh, and Seeger, the Seventh Circuit explained that its 
definition of religion was consistent with the Supreme Court’s “broad 
definition of ‘religion,’” which includes theistic, atheistic and non-
theistic beliefs.
166
  
 
C. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Religious 
Accommodations and the Neutrality Principle 
 
As previously discussed, neutrality does not prevent the 
government from accommodating religion. But, it does forbid the 
government from deviating from the corridor in between the two 
                                                 
163
 419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005). 
164
 Id. at 681. 
165
 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
166
 Id. at 682. 
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Religious Clauses, in which permissible religious accommodations 
may exist. Since neutrality is a principle, and not a rule or a test, there 
are no factors or prongs to determine when the deviation from that 
corridor has been enough to turn an otherwise valid religious 
accommodation into an impermissible advancement or establishment 
of religion. Recognizing the lack of factors or prongs, the Supreme 
Court has aptly stated that “[a]t some point, [an] accommodation may 
devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion.’”167 The lack of set 
rules does not mean, however, that there are no parameters that help 
establish that an accommodation violates the neutrality principle. To 
the contrary, it is well settled that an accommodation that has the 
intention or effect of preferring one religion over another or religion in 
general over nonreligion is outside of the boundaries of benevolent 
neutrality permitted by the Establishment Clause.
168
 In deciding 
whether an accommodation prefers certain religious denominations or 
religion in general over nonreligion, the best guidance is provided in 
judicial precedent that has applied the principle of neutrality, even if 
not explicitly, to contested religious accommodations. The following 
Supreme Court cases illustrate the demands of the neutrality principle 
on religious accommodations and help understand the holding of the 
Seventh Circuit in Center for Inquiry. 
 
1. United States v. Seeger 
 
United States v. Seeger represents one of the best examples in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the requirement that the government 
stays neutral towards religion when accommodating religion. Seeger is 
of particular importance to this Note because it also involved a 
challenge to a religious accommodation by individuals, who, similar to 
CFI members, held, at best, untraditional religious beliefs. There, three 
conscientious objectors challenged section 6(j) of the Universal 
                                                 
167
 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
168
 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705-
07 (1994).  
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Military Training and Service Act of 1948 under, inter alia, the 
Establishment Clause.
169
 Section 6(j), the conscientious objector 
statute, “exempte[d] from combatant training and service in the armed 
forces . . . those persons who by reason of their religious training and 
belief [we]re conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any 
form” as a form of religious accommodation.170 For purposes of the 
statute, “religious training and belief,” was defined as “an individual’s 
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to 
those arising from any human relation, but (not including) essentially 
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal 
moral code.”171 According to the conscientious objectors, the statute 
violated the Establishment Clause because the definition of “religious 
training and belief” preferred religion over nonreligion as well as 
certain religions over others.
172
  
The three objectors had applied and failed to qualify for the 
conscientious objector exemption.
173
 In their application for the 
exemption, they stated that they were conscientiously opposed to 
participation in war on reason of “religious belief and training,” but 
defined their religious beliefs in non-traditional ways.
174
 One of the 
objectors, for example, “submitted a long memorandum . . . in which 
he defined religion as the ‘sum and essence of one’s basic attitudes to 
the fundamental problems of human existence.’”175 Most importantly, 
the objectors could not say that they held their beliefs in relation to a 
                                                 
169
 U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
170
 Id. at 164-65. 
171
 Id. at 165 (internal quotations omitted). 
172
 Id.; see Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward 
A Unified Theory of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General 
Applicability, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 9, 35 (2001) (explaining that section 6(j) “[n]ot only . . 
. den[ied] conscientious objector status to those whose objection was not grounded 
on religious belief, but also . . . den[ied] that status . . . to those whose objection was 
grounded on religious belief, if they were not members of a denomination possessing 
an article of faith opposing war”). 
173
 Id. at 166-69. 
174
 Id. at 166-69, 186. 
175
 Id. at 168 (internal citations omitted). 
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Supreme Being, namely an orthodox God.
176
 Seeger, one of the 
objectors, for instance, had expressed “‘skepticism or disbelief in the 
existence of God’”177 and, explained, instead that he believed in 
“devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes . . . [as well as] in 
a purely ethical creed.’”178 Thus, the Seeger Court had to determine 
whether the beliefs of the three objectors fell within the statute’s 
definition of “religious training and belief.” To do so, the Court had to 
interpret the meaning of “religious training and belief”.179 
The Court first noted that the statute defined “religious training 
and belief” restrictively, requiring that a person hold beliefs involving 
a relationship with a traditionally conceived Supreme Being, before 
the person could be exempted from participating in war. The objectors’ 
convictions, though sincere and fundamental in their lives, did not 
conform to this notion of religion.
180
 After engaging in statutory 
interpretation, the Court concluded, however, that Congress could not 
have meant to restrict the exemption only to those who believed in a 
traditional Supreme Being, that is, a God. In the statute’s legislative 
history, the Court found evidence that Congress was aware of the 
myriad of conceptions that individuals have of a Supreme Being.
181
 As 
the Court explained, “[s]ome believe in a purely personal God, some 
in a supernatural deity; others think of religion as a way of life 
envisioning as its ultimate goal the day when all men can live together 
in perfect understanding and peace.”182 Congress, the Court reasoned, 
must have chosen the word “Supreme Being” rather than God in order 
to include all these conceptions of a Supreme Being and “keep[ ] with 
its long-established policy of not picking and choosing among 
religious beliefs.”183 Thus, “religious training and belief,” the Court 
                                                 
176
 Id. at 166-69. 
177
 Id. at 166 (internal citations omitted). 
178
 Id. 
179
 Id. at 173. 
180
 Id. at 166-69. 
181
 Id. at 174-85. 
182
 Id. at 174.  
183
 Id. at 175. 
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ultimately decided, meant “a sincere and meaningful belief which 
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the 
God.”184 Pursuant to this definition, the objectors’ beliefs qualified as 
“religious.”185 
While the Court’s interpretation of “religious training and belief” 
resulted in a remarkably strained reading of the statute—one which the 
legislative history questionably supported
186—the Court saw its 
interpretation as necessary to save the statute’s constitutionality. 
Construing the statute in this way, the Court explained, “avoid[ed] 
imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, 
exempting some and excluding others, and . . . [was] in accord with 
the well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for those 
whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets.”187 
Although the Court did not explicitly refer to the neutrality principle, 
its interpretation of “religious training and belief” clearly alludes to the 
constitutional requirement that the government remain neutral in its 
accommodation of religious beliefs. As the Court stated, Congress 
could not have intended to include some religious beliefs while 
excluding others, as that would have been prohibited by the 
Constitution.
188
 Indeed, commentators have argued that the Seeger 
Court turned the statute’s intent “upside-down” as to eliminate its 
preferentialism for religion and ensure that the statute conformed with 
the requirement of neutrality.
189
 Moreover, by defining religion to 
                                                 
184
 Id. 
185
 Id. 
186
 Id. at 188. (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The legislative history of this Act 
leaves much in the dark. But it is, in my opinion, not a tour de force if we construe 
the words ‘Supreme Being’ to include the cosmos, as well as an anthropomorphic 
entity. If it is a tour de force so to hold, it is no more so than other instances where 
we have gone to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on 
constitutional grounds. In a more extreme case than the present one we said that the 
words of a statute may be strained ‘in the candid service of avoiding a serious 
constitutional doubt.”) (internal citations omitted). 
187
 Id. at 176. 
188
 Id. 
189
 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 172, at 35-36. 
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include beliefs not founded in a belief in a god, the Court was already 
hinting to the fact that the government cannot, consistent with the 
neutrality principle, accommodate religious beliefs, but not systems of 
belief that are comparable to religion. In a later decision, Welsh v. 
United States, the Supreme Court, came to that exact conclusion.  
 
2. Welsh v. United States 
 
In Welsh v. United States,
190
 the Supreme Court was again called 
to interpret the definition of “religious training and belief” for 
purposes of the same conscientious objector statute that had been at 
issue in Seeger. Welsh involved another conscientious objector, Welsh, 
who also sought exemption from the Selective Service pursuant to the 
conscientious objector statute.
191
 While Seeger and Welsh were almost 
factually identical, there was a fundamental difference between the 
two cases. In Seeger, the government had denied the conscientious 
objectors’ claims because the conscientious objectors could not say 
that they held their religious beliefs in relation to a traditionally 
conceived Supreme Being.
192
 In Welsh, in contrast, the government 
had denied Welsh’s claim because the government “‘could find no 
religious basis for . . . [Welsh’s] beliefs, opinions, and convictions.’”193 
Welsh had insisted that his beliefs, which prohibited him from taking a 
human life, were not religious, but ethical and moral and that he held 
his beliefs “‘with the strength of . . . religious convictions.’”194 Thus, 
the Court in Welsh was “faced [with] the more serious problem of 
determining which beliefs were ‘religious’ within the meaning of the 
statute.”195 
Once again, to avoid rendering the statute unconstitutional, the 
Court interpreted “religious training and belief” to include beliefs not 
                                                 
190
 398 U.S. at 335, 338 (1970). 
191
 Id. at 335. 
192
 Id. at 337-38.  
193
 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
194
 Id. at 343. 
195
 Id. at 338.  
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rooted in religion, but that, nevertheless, “occupy in the life of . . . [an] 
individual a place parallel to that filled by . . . God” in religious 
adherents.
196
Accordingly, the Court held that “if an individual deeply 
and sincerely holds beliefs which are purely ethical or moral in source 
and content but which nevertheless impose upon him duty of 
conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, such 
individual is entitled to conscientious objector exemption,”197 as those 
beliefs are his religion.
198
 Welsh was thus entitled to the exemption.
199
 
In arriving at the conclusion that the exemption extended to non-
religious beliefs parallel to religion, the Court reiterated most of its 
analysis and rationale in Seeger.
200
 Although, the Court did not 
explicitly mention the neutrality principle, its opinion restated Seeger’s 
overriding principle that the government may not make distinctions 
among beliefs.
201
 Based on the premise that the government must 
remain neutral towards religion, and relying on its analysis of the 
legislative history of the statute in Seeger, the Court then concluded 
that Congress could not have meant to exclude parallel religious 
beliefs from the purview of the statute, as that would have been clearly 
unconstitutional.
202
 
Justice Harlan concurred with the result achieved by the 
majority,
203
 but disagreed that the majority’s opinion could be justified 
in the name of the doctrine of construing legislative enactments in a 
way that would avoid rendering them unconstitutional.
204
 The 
doctrine, he explained, permits the Court to salvage statutes when 
                                                 
196
 Id. at 340. 
197
 Id.  
198
 Id. 
199
 Id.  
200
 Id. at 339-40. 
201
 Id. at 340-41. 
202
 Id. at 339-40. 
203
 Id. at 362. Because the majority interpreted the conscientious objector 
statute to include non-religious beliefs, Welsh’s conviction for failing to submit to 
induction into the Armed Forces was reversed. Id. at 344.  
204
 Id. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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there is “reason to believe that Congress did not intend to legislate 
consequences that are unconstitutional,”205 but not to usurp 
congressional authority to evade an important constitutional issue.
206
 
According to Harlan, the legislative history of the conscientious 
objector statute unequivocally demonstrated that Congress intended to 
limit the exemption only to religious individuals.
207
 Thus, the Court 
could not “as matter of statutory construction . . . conclude that any 
asserted and strongly held belief satisfie[d] . . . [the exemption’s] 
requirements.”208 The pressing constitutional issue, Harlan stated, was 
whether the conscientious objector statute was compatible with the 
Establishment Clause.
209
 The First Amendment, he explained, 
incorporates a neutrality principle, which requires that “legislation 
must, at the very least, be neutral.”210 Congress was under no 
obligation to create a conscientious objector exemption.
211
 Having 
decided to create an exemption, however, Harlan explained, Congress 
could not “draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious 
beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other.”212 The 
conscientious objector statute, he explained, “created a religious 
benefit” by “exempting individuals whose beliefs were identical in all 
respects to those held by [Welsh] except that they derived from a 
religious source.” 213 Such favoritism, he stated, is not permitted under 
the Establishment Clause.”214  
Harlan’s concurrence is particularly illustrative of the demands of 
the neutrality principle on religious accommodations as it speaks 
directly of the principle and explains that the Establishment Clause 
                                                 
205
 Id. at 354. 
206
 Id. at 354-55. 
207
 Id. at 351-54.  
208
 Id. at 352.  
209
 Id. at 356. 
210
 Id. at 361.  
211
 Id. at 356.  
212
 Id.  
213
 Id. at 362.  
214
 Id. at 356.  
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does not tolerate distinctions between religion and parallel secular 
beliefs. More importantly, by discussing the constitutional infirmities 
from which the conscientious objector statute suffered, Harlan’s 
concurrence reveals the constitutional considerations that likely drove 
the decision of the majority to interpret religion broadly in order to 
prevent the conscientious objector statute from making unlawful 
distinctions between religious and equivalent religious beliefs. In this 
sense, Welsh, though a statutory interpretation case, becomes 
important to the resolution of challenges to religious accommodations 
in cases, like Center for Inquiry, Inc., that arise under the Constitution.  
 
3. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos 
 
 In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
215
 the Supreme Court spoke directly and 
explicitly about the relationship between religious accommodations 
and the neutrality principle. There, the Court upheld an exemption to 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that allowed not-for profit religious 
organizations to discriminate in hiring for any position on religious 
grounds.
216
 Congress had enacted Title VII to prohibit employment 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national 
origin.
217
 As originally enacted in 1964, Title VII had an exemption 
that allowed religious not-for profit employers to discriminate on 
religious grounds in hiring for religious jobs only.
218
 As amended in 
1972, the exemption, Section 702 of the Title, allowed religious not-
for profit employers to discriminate on religious grounds in hiring for 
any job, as form of religious accommodation.
219
 
                                                 
215
 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
216
 Id. at 339. 
217
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2014). 
218
 Amos, 483 U.S. at 329. 
219
 Id.  
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In Amos, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints owned 
and operated a gymnasium that was open to the public.
220
 Arthur Frank 
Mayson worked for the gymnasium as an engineer.
221
 After sixteen 
years of employment, the Church discharged him when “he failed to 
qualify for . . . a certificate that he . . . [was a] member of the Church 
and eligible to attend its temples.”222 The Church justified its actions 
under Section 702, as amended.
223
 Mayson, along with a class of 
plaintiffs, challenged the constitutionality of Section 702, alleging 
that, as applied to secular activity, it violated the neutrality principle 
because it resulted in state sponsorship of religion by granting 
religious organizations benefits in employment practices that were not 
extended to secular entities.
224
  
The Supreme Court unanimously held that Section 702, as 
amended, did not violate the principle of neutrality.
225
 Under the 
Establishment Clause, the Court explained, “there is ample room . . . 
for ‘benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist 
without [government] sponsorship.’”226 In enacting Section 702, the 
Court explained, Congress was not abandoning neutrality, but 
furthering it by “alleviat[ing] significant governmental interference 
with the ability of not-for profit religious organizations to define and 
carry out their religious missions.”227 More succinctly, the exemption 
simply removed the burden of government regulation over 
employment decisions that Title VII, as originally enacted in 1964, had 
                                                 
220
 Id. at 330. 
221
 Id.  
222
 Id. 
223
 Id. at 331. 
224
 Id. 
225
 Id. at 339-40. The Supreme Court analyzed Section 702’s compliance with 
the neutrality principle under the framework of the Lemon Test. Id. at 335-39. The 
Lemon Test is a three-pronged test to evaluate the constitutionality of a law under 
the Establishment Clause. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). The 
applicability of the Lemon Test to religious accommodations is beyond the subject 
of this Note.  
226
 Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (citations omitted).  
227
 Id. at 339.  
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placed on religious organizations.
228
 Where the “government acts with 
the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of 
religion,” the Court continued, there is “no reason to require that the 
exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities” to be in 
compliance with the neutrality principle.
229
 
 
4. Cutter v. Wilkinson 
  
In Cutter v. Wilkinson,
230
 the Supreme Court further elaborated on 
the role of neutrality in religious accommodations. There, the Court 
addressed the constitutionality of Section Three of the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) under the 
Establishment Clause.
231
 Section Three of RLUIPA provides, in 
pertinent part, that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden 
on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 
institution,” unless the burden furthers “a compelling governmental 
interest,” by “the least restrictive means.”232 RLUIPA defines 
“religious exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or 
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”233 In 
Cutter, prison inmates sued the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction, alleging that Ohio prison officials, in violation of RLUIPA, 
had burdened their exercise of “‘nonmainstream’ religions: the 
Satanist, Wicca, and Asatru . . . and the Church of Jesus Christ 
Christian.”234 Specifically, the inmates alleged that the prison officials 
had denied them, inter alia, “‘access to religious literature . . . 
opportunities for group worship that . . . [were] granted to adherents of 
mainstream religions . . . [and access to] a chaplain trained in their 
                                                 
228
 Id. at 335-36. 
229
 Id. at 338.  
230
 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
231
 Id. at 709. 
232
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (West 2000). 
233
 Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
234
 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 712.  
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faith.’”235 In response, the prison officials challenged RLUIPA’s 
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause as an improper 
advancement of religion.
236
  
The Supreme Court unanimously held that Section Three of 
RLUIPA, on its face, is an accommodation of religion permissible 
under the Establishment Clause.
237
 The Court explained that Section 
Three qualifies as a religious accommodation because it “alleviates 
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise” 
in “state-run institutions.”238 Where the government acts to remove 
“government-imposed burdens on religious exercise,” the removal “is 
more likely to be perceived ‘as an accommodation of the exercise of 
religion rather than as . . . [an advancement] of religion.’”239 Section 
Three of RLUIPA, the Court continued, does not advance or establish 
religion simply because it does not similarly accommodate the other 
constitutional rights of the inmates, which may also be subject to 
governmental burdens. Citing to Amos, the Court reiterated that 
religious accommodations “need not come packaged with benefits for 
secular entities”240 in order to comply with the neutrality principle. 
Just at the government may exempt religious organizations from 
regulations that burden the exercise of religion without having to also 
exempt secular entities, the government may choose to accommodate 
the free exercise of religion of inmates without having to also 
accommodate the inmates’ free speech or right to assemble in order to 
comply with the Establishment Clause. 
Lastly, the Court pointed out that Section Three complied with the 
Establishment Clause because it did not single out any religion for a 
particular treatment. RLUIPA, the Court stated, “confers no privileged 
status on any particular religious sect, and singles out no bona fide 
                                                 
235
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
236
 Id.  
237
 Id. at 720.  
238
 Id. at 720-21. 
239
 Id. at 720 (citations omitted).  
240
 Id. at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations omitted). 
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faith for disadvantageous treatment.”241 Given that “RLUIPA does not 
differentiate among bona fide faiths,” the Court held that it complied 
with the neutrality principle.
242
 
 
D. The Seventh Circuit’s Jurisprudence on Religious 
Accommodations and the Neutrality Principle 
 
The Seventh Circuit has also spoken about the relationship 
between religious accommodations and the neutrality principle. A very 
illustrative case is Kaufman.
243
 There, Wisconsin inmate James 
Kaufman filed a First Amendment claim against prison officials after 
they “refused to allow him to create an inmate group to study and 
discuss atheism.”244 Notwithstanding the officials’ refusal to allow 
Kaufman to start an atheist study group, the prison officials allowed 
the gatherings of Christian, Muslims, Buddhist and other inmates to 
study their respective religions.
245
 Among other things, Kaufman 
alleged that the prison officials’ actions in accommodating only certain 
religious beliefs violated the Establishment Clause.
246
 The prison 
officials, however, maintained that no religious accommodation was 
warranted for Kaufman’s beliefs because atheism, as Kaufman himself 
insisted, is not a religion.
247
   
The Seventh Circuit disagreed and held that the prison officials’ 
actions violated the Establishment Clause as they failed to comply 
with the neutrality principle.
248
 The court began its analysis by first 
concluding that Kaufman’s atheist beliefs constituted a religion for 
                                                 
241
 Id. 
242
 Id. at 723. 
243
 419 F.3d 678 (2005).  
244
 Id. at 680.  
245
 Id. at 684.  
246
 Id. at 680-81. 
247
 Id. 
248
 Id. at 683-84. In concluding that the prison officials’ actions violated the 
First Amendment, the Seventh Circuit applied the Lemon Test. See supra note 225 
for an explanation of the Lemon Test.  
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purposes of the First Amendment because they “play[ed] a central role 
in his life”249 and it was undisputed that Kaufman deeply and sincerely 
held those beliefs.
250
 The court then proceeded to explain that under 
the Establishment Clause “the government may not aid one religion, 
aid all religions or favor one religion over another.’”251 The First 
Amendment, the court explained, simply “‘does not allow a state to 
make it easier for adherents of one faith to practice their religion than 
for adherents of another faith to practice their religion, unless there is a 
secular justification for the difference in treatment.’”252 The prison 
officials, however, could not advance a secular reason that would 
support that “meeting[s] of atheist inmates would pose a greater 
security risk [to the prison] than meetings of inmates of other 
faiths.”253 While the Seventh Circuit recognized that Cutter had held 
that religious accommodations need not to extend to non-religious 
practices in order to be permissible, the court explained that Cutter did 
not resolve the neutrality principle issue in the instant case.
254
 While 
religious accommodations may be reserved only for religious groups, 
it does not follow that set of secular beliefs that qualify as religious for 
First Amendment purposes may be permissibly excluded from 
religious accommodations.
255
 The court concluded that by 
accommodating some religious beliefs, but not Kaufman’s beliefs, the 
prison officials were “promoting” and favoring certain religions, in 
violation of the Establishment Clause.”256 
 
 
                                                 
249
 Id. at 682. 
250
 Id. See supra Section IV B, for a discussion of the test the Seventh Circuit 
employed to determine whether atheism qualified as a religion for First Amendment 
purposes.  
251
 Id. at 683 (citing to Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 
1168-69 (7th Cir.1993)). 
252
 Id. (citing to Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir.1995)). 
253
 Id. at 684.  
254
 Id.  
255
 Id.  
256
 Id.  
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V. ANALYSIS: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION  
IN CENTER FOR INQUIRY 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding 
 
On July 14, 2014, in a unanimous opinion authored by Judge 
Frank H. Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit unanimously held that 
Indiana’s Solemnization Statute violated the principle of neutrality.257 
Although the court recognized that religious accommodations 
inherently treat the accommodated religion differently, it stated that 
such an explanation could “not be a complete answer” to CFI’s claims 
that the Solemnization Statute preferred religion over comparable 
secular beliefs.
258
 Given that “[n]eutrality is essential to the validity of 
an accommodation,”259 religious accommodations, the court 
explained, may neither treat religion favorably over parallel non-
religious beliefs nor confer special benefits on certain religious 
sects.
260
 Indiana’s Solemnization Statute suffered from both defects. 
The Statute conferred the authority to solemnize a marriage only to 
certain religious organizations and it also withheld such authority from 
individuals holding secular beliefs parallel to religion.
261
  
 
B. CFI’s Beliefs are the Equivalent of Religion for 
First Amendment Purposes 
 
To reach its holding, the Seventh Circuit first had to determine 
whether CFI’s beliefs qualified as a “religion” under the First 
Amendment. The State of Indiana extensively argued
262
 and, the 
                                                 
257
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014). 
258
 Id. at 872. 
259
 Id.  
260
 Id. at 872-73.  
261
 Id. at 872-74.  
262
 Id. at 871.  
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district court opined,
263
 that CFI could not be treated as a religion 
because CFI, itself, insisted that it was not a religion. CFI, however, 
maintained that its beliefs, even if not religious in a conventional 
sense, were the equivalent of religion because they occupy a place 
parallel to religion in the lives of its members.
264
 Relying on its own as 
well as Supreme Court precedent on the meaning of religion, the 
Seventh Circuit properly determined that CFI’s beliefs were the 
equivalent of religion for purposes of the First Amendment. 
 The court began its analysis by stating that under Seeger and 
Welsh a “serious and sincere[ly] held moral system” that occupies a 
place in the life of an individual parallel to that of religion must be 
treated the same as religion.
265
 The court did not have to pause to 
examine the sincerity with which members of CFI held their beliefs, as 
that was never contested. In determining that CFI’s beliefs qualified as 
a moral set of beliefs, the court deferred to CFI’s uncontroverted 
assertion that its beliefs rest on “strong ethical values based on critical 
reason and scientific inquiry.”266 The court showed the same deference 
towards CFI’s uncontested assertion that “its methods and values play 
the same role in its members’ lives as religious methods and values 
play in the lives of adherents.”267 Any further analysis under Seeger 
and Welsh would have been unnecessary. In Seeger, the Supreme 
Court had clearly stated that “a sincere and meaningful belief which 
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by 
God” is a person’s religion.268 CFI’s beliefs squarely fell within that 
definition. Moreover, it was clear that CFI’s beliefs were not different 
to those of Welsh, who had also explained his beliefs as ethical and 
                                                 
263
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Clerk, Marion Cir. Ct, No. 1:12-CV-00623-SEB, 
2012 WL 5997721, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 2012). 
264
 Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 128, at *9-11. 
265
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873. 
266
 Id. at 871. 
267
 Id.  
268
 U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). 
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moral and had maintained that it held such beliefs “‘with the strength 
of . . . traditional religious convictions.’”269  
Given, however, that Seeger and Welsh defined religion under a 
statute rather than under the Constitution, the Seventh Circuit’s 
analysis necessarily had to go further. Indeed, Seeger and Welsh 
defined religion for purposes of the conscientious objector statute, but, 
as the Seventh Circuit explained, the Supreme Court interpreted 
religion broadly as to allow the statute to pass constitutional muster.
270
 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Welsh emphatically stated that the 
conscientious objector statute had the fatal defect of preferring religion 
over nonreligion and that without the majority’s contortionism to read 
religion to include parallel moral and ethical beliefs, the statute would 
have been helplessly unconstitutional.
271
 Thus, the fact that the 
Supreme Court defined religion broadly in Seeger and Welsh to avoid 
rendering the statute unconstitutional, “implie[s] that the constitutional 
definition of religion also should be construed as broadly.”272 In fact, 
in constitutional cases, the Supreme Court has also appeared to lean 
towards a broad definition of religion.  
Accordingly, and continuing with its analysis of whether CFI’s 
beliefs qualified as religious, the Seventh Circuit cited to Torcaso, a 
                                                 
269
 Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333, 343 (1970) (citations omitted). 
270
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873. 
271
 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 354-59 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
272
 Jeffrey L. Oldham, Constitutional “Religion” A Survey of First Amendment 
Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 130 (2001); Donovan, supra 
note 159, at 52 (“[M]ost agree that we can expect the Seeger-Welsh reading, or some 
form thereof, to apply to the constitutional use of “religion.”). See also Kaufman v. 
McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing and using Welsh’s and 
Seeger’s definition of religion as the definition that governs First Amendment 
constitutional analysis); Ben Clements, Defining “Religion” in the First 
Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 538-39 (1989) (“ 
[C]ourts and commentators have generally interpreted Seeger as signaling a broad 
concept of religion for First Amendment purposes.”); Greenawalt, Religion as a 
Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 760-61 (1984) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court’s broad statutory construction of religion [in Seeger and Welsh] . . . 
has led other courts and scholars to assume that the constitutional definition of 
religion is now much more extensive than it once appeared to be.”). 
42
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constitutional case, and explained that in that case the Supreme Court 
explained in a footnote that “secular humanism must be treated the 
same as religion.”273 The Seventh Circuit’s reference to Torcaso was of 
particular importance to the resolution of whether CFI’s beliefs were 
religious because CFI’s beliefs are commonly known as secular 
humanism and courts have consistently opined that secular humanism 
is a religion under the First Amendment.
274
 And, while the footnote in 
Torcaso may arguably be dicta, the footnote “trenchantly illustrated 
the Court’s . . . [understanding] that nontheistic systems of belief can 
be labeled ‘religion.’”275 The Seventh Circuit, however, justifiably 
explained that, given that Torcaso “might be characterized as dicta,” it 
could not rely on Torcaso to conclusively determine whether CFI’s 
beliefs were religious.
276
 But, even when Torcaso may not be 
conclusive to whether CFI qualified as a religion, the Seventh Circuit 
stated that it needed to go no further than its decision in Kaufman to 
hold that CFI’s beliefs qualified as a religion.  
Kaufman, the Seventh Circuit continued, was a constitutional a 
case, in which the Seventh Circuit had held that atheism qualified as a 
religion for purposes of the First Amendment because atheism 
“occup[ies] a ‘place parallel to that filled by . . . God in traditionally 
religious persons.’”277 “What is true of atheism,” the Seventh Circuit 
continued, “is equally true of secular humanism, and as true in daily 
                                                 
273
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873. 
274
 Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality: The 
Constitutional Argument for Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 
1, 33 (2005). 
275
 Smith, supra note 159, at 95. In fact, Torcaso is often cited to convey the 
Court’s emerging understanding that, under the auspice of the First Amendment, 
religion refers to matters of ultimate concern in the lives of individuals, whether they 
stem from a belief in a deity, theism, or purely secular beliefs. See, e.g., Daniel A. 
Spiro, The Creation of A Free Marketplace of Religious Ideas: Revisiting the 
Establishment Clause After the Alabama Secular Humanism Decision, 39 ALA. L. 
REV. 1, 31 (1987). 
276
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873. 
277
 Id. (citing to Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 681). 
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life as in prison.”278 That CFI refuses to call itself a religious 
organization and that its members insist that they are not religious, the 
Seventh Circuit continued, is irrelevant to the question of whether CFI 
is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.
279
 In this regard, 
the court explained, CFI is no different to the plaintiff in Kaufman who 
also insisted that atheism was not a religion, but who, nevertheless was 
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment because his atheist 
beliefs occupied a place in his life comparable to religion.
280
 CFI 
embraces a secular moral system of beliefs, the court concluded, that 
is equivalent to religion except for the belief in a god and, as such, CFI 
is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.
281
  
 
1. The Seventh Circuit’s Omission of Yoder 
 
In concluding that CFI’s beliefs were equivalent to religion, the 
Seventh Circuit relied on Seeger, Welsh and Torcaso, to the complete 
exclusion of Yoder. At first sight, the Seventh Circuit’s omission of 
any reference to Yoder and its readiness to proceed with its analysis 
under Seeger and Welsh, while relying on Torcaso, hardly seems 
neutral to the positions of the parties. Seeger’s and Welsh’s 
interpretation of “religious belief and training” represents the Supreme 
Court’s most expansive and liberal definition of religion.282 The 
Court’s conception of religion in Torcaso, as already explained, is also 
broad. Yoder, on the other hand, appears to be an effort by the 
Supreme Court to return to a more traditional definition of religion.
283
 
                                                 
278
 Id. 
279
 Id.  
280
 Id. 
281
 Id.  
282
 See Oldham, supra note 272, at 134; Donovan, supra note 159, at 52; 
Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion 
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 267 (1989); Smith, supra note 159, at 95.  
283
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873. It is not, of course, that the Seventh 
Circuit regarded the prison context as immaterial, but for purposes of deciding what 
constitutes a religion (and whether an accommodation complies with the neutrality 
44
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Thus, those beliefs that may qualify as religious under Seeger and 
Welsh may not necessarily also be religious under Yoder.  
Notwithstanding Yoder, commentators
284
 and courts
285
 agree that 
Welsh and Seeger are the measure of what constitutes a religion for 
First Amendment purposes. Even after Yoder, the Supreme Court, 
itself, continued to adhere to a view of religion that is congruent with 
its broad definition of religion in Seeger and Welsh.
286
 The Seventh 
Circuit had also previously explained that the Supreme Court 
embraces a broad definition of religion. In Kaufman, for example, the 
Seventh Circuit stated that its expansive definition of religion was 
crafted to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s broad conception of 
religion.
287
 Given that Seeger and Welsh are consistently regarded as 
the measure of what qualifies as a religious belief under the First 
Amendment, it is justifiable and unsurprising that the Seventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                   
principle), the walls of a prison do not change the analysis of whether a set of secular 
beliefs occupies a place parallel to that of religion in the life of an individual. 
284
 See Donovan, supra note 159, at 52. 
285
 See, e.g., Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of City of  N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 126 (2d Cir. 
2007); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-3 (1985) (adhering to a broad definition 
of religion and acknowledging that religion under the First Amendment includes 
more than just traditional religious beliefs). 
286
 See Oldham, supra note 272, at 134; Clements, supra note 272, at 539 
(“Although . . . [Yoder] seem[ed] to cast doubt on the viability of the Seeger 
approach as a constitutional test for religion, it is unclear how much weight Yoder 
carries in determining the scope of “religion.” Since the state did not dispute the 
religious nature of the Amish practices, the definition of religion was not at issue, 
and the . . . [Court’s statements on religion are] dicta. As a result, Yoder should not 
necessarily be read as a rejection of the Seeger approach in constitutional cases.); 
Ingber, supra note 134, at 263. (“[T]he Yoder opinion made no effort to define 
religion.”); Smith, supra note 159, at 97 (stating that even when Yoder may have 
suggested an attempt by the Supreme Court to “commence the task of formulating a 
conservative content-based definition of it . . . Yoder has remained an island unto 
itself”). See also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52-3 (speaking of religion in broad terms, 
acknowledging that religion encompasses more than just beliefs in relationship to a 
god); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (explaining in dicta that 
Seeger is the governing framework to determine whether a particular belief is 
religious under the First Amendment). 
287
 Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 682. 
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did not even mention Yoder. Yoder would not have changed the result 
the Seventh Circuit reached as CFI’s beliefs are not a mere way of 
living or a simple philosophy and, the fact that CFI is an organized 
group would have provided any evidence of religious affiliation that 
Yoder may require. An application of Yoder, however, would have 
resulted in confusion as to what the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme 
Court regard as the appropriate test to determine what qualifies as a 
religious belief. Specifically, an application of Yoder would have 
mistakenly signaled a judicial attempt to return to a more traditional 
definition of religion when, in fact, the Supreme Court’s and the 
Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence on religion have, for the most part, 
moved towards a broad and liberal definition of religion. The Supreme 
Court and the Seventh Circuit have interpreted religion broadly to 
recognize the rich and diverse beliefs that citizens in this country 
regard as their “religion.”288 An adoption of the narrower definition of 
religion of Yoder could potentially leave many beliefs that are the 
equivalent of religion unprotected under the Religious Clauses and, in 
turn, hinder the continued existence of religious exercise without 
government interference.  
Nonetheless, a mention to Yoder for the discrete purpose of 
refuting the district court’s suggestion that CFI’s only purpose in 
asserting that its beliefs were equivalent to religion was to avoid the 
inconveniences of marriage regulation would have been justified. In 
Yoder, the Supreme Court warned that mere philosophies and “ways of 
living” could not trigger the protection of the Religious Clauses and 
thus, allow individuals to escape proper state regulation.
289
 Hence, the 
Court explained that had the Amish expressed their objections to 
compulsory education in terms of a subjective evaluation of the value 
of such education or a belief that there were better or alternative ways 
to live one’s life, the Amish would not have been entitled to a religious 
exemption.
290
 Just as that was not the case of the Amish, it was also 
                                                 
288
 See, e.g., U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,  174-85 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 
367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961).  
289
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). 
290
 Id. at 216. 
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not the case of CFI. First, CFI’s system of beliefs is not a philosophy 
or way of living. CFI embraces a set of moral and ethical beliefs, 
which in turn, direct and guide the lives of its members in the same 
way religion governs the lives of adherents. Second, and most 
importantly, CFI did not challenge the Solemnization Statute based on 
a subjective evaluation of state regulation of marriage. Instead, CFI 
challenged the Solemnization Statute on the grounds that the Statute 
prevented CFI members from having a “ceremony solemnized by 
someone who share[d] the[ ] [very] ethics and beliefs”291 that guide 
their lives. That CFI does not have a doctrinal stance on marriage, as 
some traditional religions do, does not mean that CFI members do not 
regard “having a ceremony solemnized by someone who shares their 
ethics and beliefs as extremely important and necessary . . . way of 
expressing their values.”292 In fact, the very reason why the state of 
Indiana had decided to accommodate traditional religions was to honor 
the “preferences . . . [of members of those religions] not to become 
legally . . . [married] until the moment when . . . [their marriage was] 
also consecrated by a religious ceremony” that celebrated their 
values.
293
 
Related to this point, the Seventh Circuit regarded as meritless 
Indiana’s assertion that members of CFI were not excluded from the 
Solemnization Statute because they could “first get a license, then 
have a . . . [CFI secular] celebrant perform a public ceremony 
appropriate to their beliefs, and finally have a court clerk or similar 
functionary solemnize the marriage.”294 That assertion, the Seventh 
Circuit stated, only “restate[d] the discrimination” that the CFI was 
suffering at the hands of the State of Indiana.
295
 CFI’s “ability to carry 
out a sham ceremony, with the real business done in a back of office,” 
the Seventh Circuit stated, does not address the fact that CFI is parallel 
                                                 
291
 Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 128, at *7. 
292
 Id.  
293
 Brief of Appellees, supra note 14, at *23-24. 
294
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 
2014). 
295
 Id.  
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to religion for purposes of the Solemnization Statute and that it thus 
should be treated the same way as religion.
296
 By condemning 
Indiana’s suggestion that CFI could simply resort to sham ceremonies, 
the Seventh Circuit exalted the importance of respecting the diversity 
of religious beliefs and the premise that the Establishment class 
protects traditional religious beliefs as well as all other beliefs that 
citizens may sincerely regard as the equivalent of religion in their 
lives. 
 
C. Indiana’s Solemnization Statute Violates  
the Neutrality Principle 
 
Once the Seventh Circuit determined that CFI’s beliefs were the 
equivalent of religion, it proceeded to an analysis of the Solemnization 
Statute under the neutrality principle. The Seventh Circuit began by 
stating that under Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent 
“neutrality is essential to the validity of an accommodation.”297 Thus, 
when the state accommodates religion, it cannot choose favorites
298—
that is, it cannot draw distinctions between religious denominations 
and “religious and secular beliefs that hold the same place in 
adherents’ lives.”299 Indiana’s Solemnization Statute, the court stated, 
made those very distinctions by granting the authority to solemnize 
marriages only to certain religious sects, while excluding certain other 
denominations as well groups that hold beliefs equivalent to religion, 
even though all of them celebrate marriage.
300
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
296
 Id. 
297
 Id. 
298
 Id.  
299
 Id. at 873.  
300
 Id. at 872-74. 
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1. Neutrality towards Secular Beliefs that are the  
Equivalent of Religion 
 
The Seventh Circuit first noted that the Solemnization Statute 
failed to comply with the neutrality principle because it “favored 
religions over non-theistic groups that have moral stances that are 
equivalent to theistic ones.”301 The court explained that the 
Solemnization Statute favored religion over equivalent secular beliefs 
by extending the authority to solemnize a civil marriage only to 
religious groups. Those who embrace those equivalent belief systems, 
the court explained, “want their own views to be expressed by 
celebrants at marriages,” and “the state must treat them the same way 
it treats religion.”302 Thus, given that the state of Indiana chose to 
accommodate the marriage ceremonies of traditional religions, it was 
required to also accommodate the marriage celebrations of CFI.
303
  
Indiana’s argument, the court continued, that, under Marsh v. 
Chambers, Indiana may permissibly accommodate religious groups 
without extending the accommodation to parallel non-religious groups 
was meritless.
304
 In Marsh, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of opening state legislative sessions with non-
sectarian, Judeo-Christian prayer by a clergyman.
305
 In upholding the 
prayer, the Supreme Court stated that, notwithstanding that the prayer 
was based in the Judeo-Christian tradition and conducted by a 
clergyman from only one denomination, the prayer was not an 
establishment of religion.
306
 Instead, the Court explained, the prayer 
was “simply a tolerable acknowledgement”307 of the long and widely 
held practice in this country of opening legislative sessions with prayer 
                                                 
301
 Id. at 873.  
302
 Id.  
303
 Id.  
304
 Id. at 874.  
305
 463 U.S. 783, 792-95 (1983).  
306
 Id.  
307
 Id. at 792. 
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by a chaplain.
308
 Stretching the holding of Marsh from its unique 
application to legislative prayer,
309
 Indiana had argued that Marsh 
allows governments to permissibly—that is, consistent with the 
neutrality principle—accommodate religion without having to extend 
the accommodation to non-religious groups.
310
 More specifically, 
Indiana argued, that “[j]ust as legislative bodies may invite clergy to 
give a prayer without also inviting secular humanists to give non-
religious speeches, so may states . . . delegate to religious clergy . . . 
the function of solemnizing marriages without also delegating that 
function to other” non-religious groups.311  
The Seventh Circuit properly found Marsh inapplicable.
312
 Marsh, 
the Seventh Circuit explained, concerned the long-held practice of 
opening legislative sessions with non-denominational prayer.
313
 Thus, 
Marsh dealt with “the government’s own operations;” not with the 
government’s regulation of private conduct.314 This was an important 
distinction as an inherent characteristic of a religious accommodation 
is that it lifts regulatory burdens the government has previously placed 
on the exercise of religion of private individuals and entities. All 
Marsh establishes, the Seventh Circuit continued, is “that a 
government may, consistent with the First Amendment, open 
legislative sessions with Christian prayers while not inviting leaders of 
                                                 
308
 Id. at 792, 786. 
309
 See, e.g., Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 
1998) (“[T]he evolution of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence indicates that the 
constitutionality of legislative prayers is a sui generis legal question.”); Cammack v. 
Waihee, 932 F. 2d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing to apply Marsh outside of the 
context of legislative prayer based on “reluctan[ce] to extend a ruling explicitly 
based upon the ‘unique history’ surrounding legislative prayer” to different 
contexts.); Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 74 (D.R.I.) aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st 
Cir. 1990) aff'd, 505 U.S. 577, (1992) (“The Marsh holding was narrowly limited to 
the unique situation of legislative prayer.”). 
310
 Brief of Appellees, supra note 14, at *22-25. 
311
 Id. at *22-23.  
312
 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 
2014). 
313
 Id.  
314
 Id.  
50
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other religions.”315 Marsh, however, “do[es] not begin to suggest that a 
state could limit the solemnization of weddings” to certain religious 
groups.
316
  
While the Seventh Circuit correctly explained that Marsh did not 
establish that states may accommodate religious beliefs while 
excluding parallel secular beliefs, the Seventh Circuit did not address 
how Amos and Cutter do not support such a conclusion. Both, Amos 
and Cutter addressed religious accommodations and stated that 
“religious accommodations need not come packaged with benefits for 
secular entities” to comply with the neutrality principle.317 At first 
sight, Amos and Cutter may appear to support Indiana’s argument that 
it needed not to accommodate the beliefs of CFI in the Solemnization 
Statute to comply with the Establishment Clause. A closer look, 
however, reveals that Amos and Cutter cannot be taken to hold that the 
government may, consistent with the neutrality principle, 
accommodate only individuals or organizations that embrace 
traditional religious beliefs while denying the same accommodation to 
groups that have a belief system that is comparable to religion.
318
 The 
Seventh Circuit likely recognized this at the beginning of the opinion 
by stating that while Amos and other Supreme Court cases explain that 
“accommodations, by definition, treat the accommodated religion 
differently from one or more secular groups,” that could not be “a 
complete answer” to the fact that Indiana’s Solemnization Statute 
distinguished between religion and comparable secular beliefs. 
319
 
Indeed, Amos and Cutter could not be an answer to the 
distinctions the Solemnization Statute made as those cases more likely 
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317
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Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005). 
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 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior 
and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
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a context where other religious practices are equally relevant to the exemption”). 
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 Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 872. 
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stand for the more general proposition that the government does not 
violate the neutrality principle simply when, with the purpose of 
accommodating religion, it lifts government-imposed regulations from 
religious organizations, without also lifting the regulation from the rest 
of society. Such a conclusion is warranted given that Amos and Cutter, 
in contrast to Seeger and Welsh, did not address challenges to the 
accommodations at issue by groups claiming that their religious or 
comparable religious beliefs had been excluded from the 
accommodations. Instead, Amos and Cutter addressed challenges to 
the accommodations by groups who, far from claiming a religious 
entitlement to the accommodations, simply argued that the exemptions 
or “benefits” the accommodations conferred on religious groups had to 
be extended to all groups in order for the accommodations to be 
constitutional. For example, in Amos the Court only addressed the 
validity of Section 702 of Title VII in general, concluding that it did 
not violate the neutrality principle because it is simply sought to lift 
regulatory burdens the state had placed on the exercise of religion of 
religious entities. Given these distinctions, Amos and Cutter are better 
read as simply “creat[ing] a zone of [constitutionally] permissible 
accommodation of religion.”320 It does not follow, however, that 
Amos’s and Cutter’s recognition that the government may 
accommodate religion, that an accommodation may constitutionally be 
limited to religious beliefs to the exclusion of equivalent beliefs.
321
 In 
fact, the opposite is true. In Cutter, for instance, the Supreme Court 
specifically explained that RLUIPA was facially constitutional because 
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allude[ ] to the issue, the logic of the Religion Clauses requires that accommodations 
be extended to all comparable religious practices.”). 
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it did not suffer from the fatal defect of discriminating among “bona-
fide faiths.”322 
An argument that by “bona-fide faith” the Supreme Court was 
referring only to sincerely held religious beliefs, but not sincerely held 
equivalent beliefs, is possible, but highly questionable, as that would 
have contradicted the Court’s long-standing jurisprudence on the 
meaning of religion. Given the Supreme Court’s history of defining 
religion broadly, it is unlikely that Amos and Cutter controverted the 
Court’s holding in Seeger and Welsh that religious accommodations 
must extend to secular systems of belief which are the equivalent of 
religion. The Seventh Circuit’s discussion of Seeger, Welsh and 
Torcasso in determining that CFI’s beliefs were equivalent to religion 
stresses this point. Under those cases, the Seventh Circuit explained, 
the state must treat secular systems that are equivalent to religion “the 
same way it treats religion.”323 Thus, while Amos and Cutter allow the 
government to accommodate religion, the authority to accommodate, 
as the Seventh Circuit properly pointed out, “does not imply an ability 
to favor religions over non-theistic groups that have moral stances that 
are equivalent to theistic ones except for non-belief in God or 
unwillingness to call themselves religions.”324  
The fact that CFI refused to call itself a religion colored the entire 
opinion of the Seventh Circuit. In analyzing the compliance of the 
Solemnization Statute with the neutrality principle, the Seventh Circuit 
could have simply referred to CFI as just another religious 
denomination, instead of referring to it as the equivalent of religion (or 
parallel to religion), and dispose of the issue that way. Such a course 
of action would have made the analysis more straightforward as the 
Establishment Clause does not tolerate distinctions between religions. 
The court chose, however, not to carry the analysis in that manner 
probably out of respect for CFI’s insistence that it refutes theism and 
that it is far and foremost not a religious organization. Moreover, the 
court probably decided not to label CFI as a religion in order to 
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promote the acceptance of the rich and diverse beliefs that Americans 
now embrace as their “religion.” If the Supreme Court and the Seventh 
Circuit have defined religion so broadly has been precisely to avoid 
distinctions among beliefs and to afford citizens the free exercise of 
their “religion” without sponsorship and without interference. In this 
respect, the Seventh Circuit had strong words for the State of Indiana, 
which had attempted to diminish CFI’s claims by stating that all CFI 
needed to do to come within the purview of the Solemnization Statute 
was to declare itself a religious organization and its leaders members 
of the clergy.
325
 Indiana’s willingness, the court stated, “to recognize 
marriages performed by hypocrites,” 326 only served to show that, in 
fact, the Solemnization Statute preferred religion over nonreligious 
parallel beliefs.
327
 The Solemnization Statute’s preference for religion 
over comparable secular beliefs, the Seventh Circuit thus concluded, 
violated the neutrality principle.
328
  
 
2. Neutrality between Religions 
 
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit continued, Indiana’s Solemnization 
Statute violated the neutrality principle because it also preferred 
certain religions. As an initial matter, the Seventh Circuit stated that 
the Solemnization Statute ran afoul of the neutrality principle because 
it purported to prefer religions that have clergy as opposed to those 
with a different organizational structure as well as religions that accord 
“a sacred status to marriage” as opposed to those that see marriage as a 
celebration of their values.
329
 Those distinctions, the Seventh Circuit 
explained, are flatly prohibited by the Establishment Clause, which 
“clearest command . . . is that one religious denomination cannot be 
officially preferred over another.”330 Worse still, deeper analysis of the 
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Solemnization Statute, the court explained, showed that the 
Solemnization Statute was more than an attempt to accommodate 
religions having clergy and a commitment to marriage. The Statute 
picked and chose favorites. Quakers, for example, could solemnize 
civil marriages in their own marriage ceremonies by virtue of being 
listed in subsection (6) of the Statute, even though they do not have 
clergy and “do not treat marriage as a sacrament.”331 This kind of 
favoritism, the court rightfully concluded, added to the problem that 
that Solemnization Statute already violated the neutrality principle by 
preferring religion over parallel secular beliefs.  
The Seventh Circuit thus reversed the judgment of the district 
court and “remanded with instructions to issue an injunction” allowing 
CFI’s secular celebrants “to solemnize marriages in Indiana—to do 
this with legal effect, and without risk of criminal penalties.”332  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In holding that Indiana’s Solemnization Statute violated the 
neutrality principle, the Seventh Circuit properly relied on its own as 
well as Supreme Court precedent that supports a broad definition of 
religion. Given the long standing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 
in defining religion broadly, the Seventh Circuit was correct in 
omitting a discussion of precedent that arguably calls for a narrower 
definition of religion as that would have threatened to cause confusion 
as to the proper test for determining what qualifies as religion for 
purposes of First Amendment analysis. In a society that is diversely 
rich in religious beliefs, a narrower definition would have put in 
jeopardy the religious exercise of many Americans, in turn, 
threatening the requirement that the government remains neutral 
towards religion. Although the Seventh Circuit also did not discuss a 
line of Supreme Court cases that appeared to support the state of 
Indiana’s argument that the authority to solemnize a marriage needed 
not to be extended to secular entities to comply with the principle of 
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neutrality, those cases did not require a different result. While the 
Supreme Court has indeed stated that religious accommodations are 
reserved for religious entities and practices, it does not follow that 
once a secular set of beliefs qualifies as a religion under the First 
Amendment, it can, nevertheless, be denied the accommodation a 
government bestows upon traditional religious groups. CFI was thus 
entitled to an accommodation under Indiana’s Marriage Solemnization 
Statute. 
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